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Abstract - Concern for relative consumption introduces an additional source of risk for future pensioners. 
We study its implications, in terms of optimal risk diversification, for the choice of the mix between a pay-
as-you-go and a funded pension systems. We identify a necessary and sufficient condition for the optimal 
share of pay-as-you-go to be larger when relative consumption matters.  We argue that when model 
parameters assume reasonable values such condition is satisfied. 
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It is well known that the benets from a fully funded (FF) system depend on
the return on nancial markets, while in a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system the
relevant variable is the growth of the contribution base, which depends on
productivity and labor supply growth. Therefore, in a situation of dynamic
eciency the steady state return from a FF is higher than the steady state
return from a PAYG system. However, when risk enters the picture this is
not enough to conclude that the optimal pension system should not include
a PAYG component: when returns are stochastic and they are not perfectly
correlated, it is possible to diversify risks by optimally choosing a mix of
PAYG and FF. Indeed, in recent years a number of papers have emphasized
the role of social security in providing intergenerational risk sharing with
respect to several sources of risk, including return on nancial markets, de-
mographic and productivity shocks.1 According to this perspective, a role
for a PAYG pension system may be recognized|at least in principle|as a
way to hedge risks to future pensioners' benets when nancial markets are
incomplete.
Conclusions on the optimal mix of PAYG and FF have been obtained
so far under the standard assumption that individuals care only for their
absolute level of consumption. However, there exists now substantial evi-
dence suggesting that people also care about their consumption relative to
others' (see Frey and Stutzer, 2000, 2002; Luttmer, 2005; Clark, Frijters and
Shields, 2008, and references therein). Although the economic implications
of people's concerns for relative standing have been widely investigated,2 to
the best of our knowledge no one has so far inquired the consequences of
such an assumption for the insurance properties of pension schemes.
In this paper we show that when model parameters assume reasonable
values the relative consumption hypothesis reinforces the case for the PAYG
solution. The basic intuition of our result is the following: when people
care for their future relative position in terms of consumption, productivity
growth aects the value of a given amount of pension because it aects the
consumption of the future generation of young. This generates an additional
risk that cannot be insured eectively by a FF system, while it can be coped
with by an increase of the PAYG component, whose return is itself related
1Among others: Gordon and Varian (1988), Shiller (1999), Dutta, Kapur and Orszag
(2000) Bohn (2001, 2004), Wagener (2003b), Matsen and Thgersen (2004), Krueger and
Kubler (2006), Ball and Mankiw (2007).
2See, for instance, Bagwell and Bernheim (1996), Clark and Oswald (1998), Cole, Mailath
and Postlewaite (1992), Cooper, Garcia-Penalosa and Funck (2001), Corneo and Jeanne
(1997), Frank (1985), Hopkins and Kornienko (2004), Ireland (2001).
1to productivity growth.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present a simple OLG
model suited for our purposes, and we identify the conditions for the optimal
mix of FF and PAYG systems when individuals care only about their absolute
consumption. In section 3 we modify the model to allow individuals to care
also for their relative consumption, and discuss how the optimal mix between
PAYG and FF is modied. We nd a necessary and sucient condition
identifying the cases in which concern for relative consumption enhances the
role of the PAYG, and we argue that this condition will be satised within
the relevant parameter range. In section 4 we conclude and provide some
nal remarks about the scope and relevance of our ndings.
2. The optimal mix between FF and PAYG when only absolute
consumption matters
2.1. The model
We consider a succession of generations t;t+1;:::, each one represented by a
risk averse individual living two periods (we will use the terms \individual"
and \generation" interchangeably). By considering a single representative
for each generation we will disregard intra-generational distribution and risk
sharing. Each representative individual works when young, and lives on
savings and social security when old. We indicate consumption of generation
t when young (in period t) as c1;t, and consumption when old (in period t+1)
as c2;t.
Let the income of individual t be wt. Income is taxed at a rate t to
nance a PAYG pension system; twt is transferred to period t pensioner
(i.e. to individual t   1). When young, each individual saves a share st of
his/her income. We make the assumption that rst period consumption c1;t
always comes in a xed proportion of wt, namely c1;t = 
wt. In other terms,
st is chosen by each generation to satisfy

wt = wt(1      st) (1)
or st = 1   t   
. Under this assumption, the young will react to a change
in t by increasing or decreasing savings, and the choice of t by the gov-
ernment will not aect 
. This assumption is justied by the fact that we
are interested in how resources devoted to old age are best divided between
st and t, i.e. in the mix of savings (in a FF system) and contributions (to
a PAYG system), while we will not discuss here the overall pension/saving
level.3
3This is similar to, and no more restrictive than, the assumption usually made in this
2We don't explicitly consider capital accumulation. Instead, we take the
growth rate gt from period t to period t + 1 and the interest rate rt as ex-
ogenously given; this hypothesis corresponds to the case of a small open
economy, and allows us to concentrate only on the intergenerational risk-
sharing eect of pensions. We assume that gt and rt are stochastic, that
they are not perfectly correlated, and that their joint distribution is ellip-
tically symmetric.4 We assume that these variables are independently and
identically distributed over time.
In our analysis, we focus on the eect of shocks aecting labour pro-
ductivity and capital market returns; to make things simpler, we disregard
demographic risk by assuming that population does not change from one pe-
riod to another, and growth is entirely explained by changes in productivity.
It is possible to consider two dierent notions of intergenerational risk
sharing. We might be interested in an ex ante perspective, i.e. we can as-
sume the point of view of each generation before his income in the rst period
is known, and focus on what perhaps is better described as a problem of op-
timal redistribution among generations rather than of design of an optimal
insurance scheme.5 However, we are more interested in the attitude of the
active population toward social security as a true insurance device. There-
fore, we consider the point of view of the individual worker contributing to
his/her pension plan when young: we evaluate risk when individuals already
know the realization of variables in their rst period of life. Namely, utility
is evaluated assuming that the individual knows the realization of wt but
considers rt and gt { and, hence, wt+1 = (1+gt)wt { as random variables. In
doing so, we adopt the so called interim perspective.
The properties of a PAYG system as an insurance device depends on the
nature of the contract among generation implied by the way it adjusts to
respond to dierent shocks.6 Hence, in one case the pension system might
grant each generation of pensioners a given level of benets, dened as a
function of their earnings in the previous period, and t is adjusted in each
period to secure that the budget is balanced. Alternatively, the contribution
rate  can be xed for all generation, and it is the level of benets which
class of models that consumption by the young is zero. In our model assuming the young
do not consume at all would have not allowed us to consider relative consumption level of
the old and the young.
4The latter property will allow us to pass to a two-moment representation of preferences
(Chamberlain, 1983; Eichner and Wagener, 2003). It requires that the level curves of the
joint density function are all ellipses obtainable by means of an ane transformation of
circumferences. Joint normality is a special case of elliptical symmetry.
5Matsen and Thgersen (2004) refer to the ex ante perspective as \Rawlsian" risk sharing.
6For an extensive discussion of possible contracts and their eects, see e.g. Musgrave
(1981).
3is adjusted to satisfy the budget constraint; under such a provision, each
generation transfers a share  of its income to the previous generation, in
exchange for a similar commitment by the next generation. It is clear that
under the latter system (but not under the former) the eects of shocks af-
fecting next period wage base can be shared between the next generation of
workers and pensioners. Indeed, Hassler and Lindbeck (1998) show that, un-
der the interim perspective on risk sharing (which they refer to as \true risk
sharing"), it is only when  is xed across generations that intergenerational
risk sharing is possible and the pension system can provide hedging against
the risky returns of private savings. For this reason we will focus on the case
of t = , disregarding other possible intergenerational contracts.7
In this framework,  2 [0;1 
] can be interpreted directly as the chosen
mix of FF and PAYG.
2.2. Utility maximization and the optimal mix of FF and PAYG
For comparative purposes, we will rst study the case where individuals only
care about their absolute level of consumption. Later on, we will modify the
model assuming that individuals care about their consumption relative to a
standard of living which depends on others' consumption. This will allow us
to show how the optimal FF-PAYG mix changes when relative consumption
matters.
Note that, since 
 is exogenously given, consumption in the rst period
depends only on the realization of wt. Therefore, the optimal choice of  can
be calculated considering only the expected value of utility in the second
period, which we denote as E[u(c2;t)]. Second period consumption depends
on the realization of both rt and gt and on the level of :
c2;t = st(1 + rt)wt + (1 + gt)wt = [(1   
)(1 + rt) + (gt   rt)]wt: (2)
Under the assumption that the joint distribution of rt and gt is ellipti-
cally symmetric, whatever the function u, we can switch from E[u(c2;t)] to a
two-moment representation of preferences (Eichner and Wagener, 2003), and
express the conditions identifying the optimal choice of  for each genera-
tion as a function of the mean, variance and covariance of gt and rt. More
precisely, our representation will be based on the mean and the standard
7A possible interesting alternative from our point of view is a pension contract specifying
that the ratio between the representative pension and the representative wage must be
kept constant across periods. Note that this corresponds to the case of xed  under our
hypothesis that population is stationary, while the two cases are not equivalent in general.
4deviation of c2;t:
E[c2;t] = wt[(1   
   )(1 + r) + (1 + g)] (3)
S[c2;t] =
q











r = Var[rt], 2
g = Var[gt] and rg = Cov[rt;gt].
Preferences of individual t are now described by the dierentiable function
V (E[c2;t];S[c2;t]) VE > 0;VS < 0 (5)
where risk-aversion implies that V is concave in its arguments (Meyer, 1987).


























r   gr)   (2
g   gr)
(7)
where the ratio  VS=VE is a measure of the local degree of risk aversion
(Ormiston and Schlee, 2001; Lajeri and Nielsen, 2000; Wagener, 2003a).
Note that, in general, the optimal  depends on VS=VE, which in turn may
depend on the level of wt. Hence, the optimal  will be dierent for genera-
tions facing dierent realizations of wt. This problem of time inconsistency
is well known in the literature (Lindbeck and Persson, 2003; Matsen and
Thgersen, 2004). In order to avoid it, we assume that preferences exhibit
constant relative risk aversion.8 Under this assumption, the ratio VS=VE is
homogeneous of degree zero in its argument (see Meyer, 1987, Property 6),
so that it does not depend on the realization of wt. This implies that it is
possible to identify a single  which is optimal for all generations.
A pure FF system is optimal from the point of view of the individual
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where gr = gr=(gr) is the correlation coecient between rt and gt.
8This assumption, though quite strong, is consistent with the common observation that
individuals usually show decreasing absolute risk aversion.
5If returns on nancial markets are, on average, lower than the growth
of the contribution base, i.e. g > r, then  > 0 independently of other
parameter values. Instead, if g < r, it is possible that  = 0. In particular,
it is more likely that  = 0 the less individuals are risk averse, the more gt
and rt are correlated and, provided that gr > 0, the lower is r with respect
to g.9
In conclusion, when returns on nancial markets are greater on average
than the growth of the contribution base, the role of a PAYG system is that of
providing risk diversication. This is made clear by the fact that if nancial
investments are riskless, i.e. r = 0, condition (8) is always satised and we
have that  = 0.
3. The optimal mix when relative consumption matters
3.1. Results
In this section we modify the model in order to consider the case where
individuals care for relative consumption. More precisely, we assume that
utility from consumption depends not only on absolute consumption but also
on the current standard of living.
The new utility function for the second period (old age) is u(c2;t;t+1)
where t+1 is the standard of living at time t+1. We assume, as it seems rea-
sonable, that the relevant standard of living is a convex combination of the
consumption of the young and the old a time t+1. We further assume that
a positive change in the standard of living can be translated into a negative
change in absolute consumption according to a constant factor  > 0; the lat-
ter variable measures the intensity of concern for the current standard of liv-
ing. This assumption, together with the fact that t+1 is a linear function of
both c2;t and c1;t+1, implies that we can dene ~ u(c2;t c1;t+1) = u(c2;t;t+1),
where  2 (0;] represents how much the old generation values|in terms
of their own consumption|an increase in the consumption of the young
generation at t + 1. Since we have that
c2;t   c1;t+1 = [(   
)(1 + g) + (1      
)(1 + r)]wt (9)
we can pass to a two-moment representation of preferences over uncertain
outcomes,10 i.e.
9Our conclusion is consistent with what is known in the literature. See e.g. Dutta et al.
(2000) and Matsen and Thgersen (2004, sec. 3.2).
10Again, this is possible because the argument of the utility function is a linear combina-
tion of stochastic variables which have been assumed to be elliptically symmetric.
6~ V (E[c2;t   c1;t+1];S[c2;t   c1;t+1]): (10)
where ~ V is assumed to satisfy the same properties of V and
E[c2;t   c1;t+1] = wt[(1   
   )(1 + r) + (   
)(1 + g)] (11)
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Note that, by letting individuals care also for t, we have redened in-
dividuals' preferences. This may preclude a meaningful comparison between
the optimal FF-PAYG mix obtained from (7) and the mix obtained under the
relative consumption hypothesis. Indeed, if by changing preferences we also
change the degree of risk aversion, we may not be able to establish to what
extent our conclusions are driven by the relative consumption hypothesis or
by such changes. In order to overcome this diculty, it seems reasonable to
normalize the new utility so that, in the situation identied by , V and ~ V
give rise to the same attitude towards risk, i.e. VS=VE = ~ VS=~ VE at .11
Under this assumption, we can think of our approach as follows: we know
that  is the optimal contribution rate when we observe a certain attitude
towards risk and under the assumption that the individuals do not care for
relative consumption. Assume instead that, though at  they have the
same attitude towards risk, individuals do care for relative consumption: is
 underestimating or overestimating the optimal ?
Let ~  be the optimal contribution to the PAYG system when individuals
do care for relative consumption. The discussion above allows us to state
our main result:
Proposition 1. Under the assumptions that (i) r > g and (ii) VS=VE =
~ VS=~ VE at , we have that
11What we are requiring is that at the state of the world dened by , the way in which the
individual trades-o a small change in the mean and standard deviation of her consumption,
when everything else is left unchanged, is independent of whether the individual cares about
the standard of living or not.
7a) 0 <  < 1   























b)  = 0 implies that ~  > 0 only if (14) holds; in particular, for any
 2 (0;], there exists a high enough degree of risk aversion at  = 0
such that ~  > 0. 2
Proof. Part a). From the fact that V is concave in (E;S), E is linear and
S is strictly convex12 at , follows that V is strictly concave in . The same
is true of ~ V .
To simplify notation, we write E0 for @E[c2;t]=@ and S0 for @S[c2;t]=@;
similarly, let ~ E0 be @E[c2;t   c1;t+1]=@ and ~ S0 = @S[c2;t   c1;t+1]=@.
Assume that 0 <  < 1 
. Strict concavity implies that ~  >  if and
only if ~ V is increasing in  at . The rst order conditions for a maximum
imply that at  we have VS=VE =  E0=S0, where E0 < 0 because of (i).
From (ii) and from the fact that E0 = ~ E0 follows that ~ V is increasing at 
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r   gr)   (
2
g   gr)]: (16)
Note that the term in squared brackets on the right hand side must be
positive at , since the numerator of S0 must be negative at an interior
optimum. By solving for 1= and rearranging terms we obtain condition
(14).
Part b). Suppose that  = 0. The rst order condition for the maxi-
mization of V implies that at  = 0 we have S0   (VEE0)=VS. From the rst
12It can be easily checked that the second order derivative of S with respect to  is
positive|hence strict convexity is granted|provided that rt and gt are not perfectly cor-
related.
8derivative of ~ V with respect to  we get that, at  = 0, ~ V increases in  only
if ~ S0 <  (~ VE ~ E0)=~ VS. Hypotheses (i)-(ii) imply that, at  = 0, ~ V increases in
 only if ~ S0 < S0. As shown above, the latter condition is equivalent to (14).
Finally, form strict concavity follows that if ~ S0 <  (~ VE ~ E0)=~ VS then ~  > 0.
Since ~ E0 is a constant, ~ S0 is bounded from below, while ~ VS=~ VE is both nega-
tive and unbounded from below, we conclude that for every  2 (0;] there
exists a degree of risk aversion at  = 0 such that ~ S0 <  (~ VE ~ E0)=~ VS. 
Figure 1 shows the optimality conditions in the (S;E)-space when 0 <
 < (1 
) and condition (14) is satised. Suppose rst that only absolute
consumption matters. If R > g, the locus of feasible combinations of
standard errors and expected values determined by  is given by the curve
FF (where E decreases in ). The slope of the curve FF is equal to the
ratio between the derivatives of E and S with respect to , and the shape
of the curve re
ects the fact that E is linear in  while S is convex in .
Concavity of V implies that indierence curves are convex. The condition
that identies  is the tangency between the FF curve and the highest
feasible indierence curve.
Suppose now that relative consumption matters. Since the attitude to-
wards risk is unchanged at , also the slope of the indierence curve is
unchanged at that point. Hence, a necessary and sucient condition for
~  >  is that the slope of the new curve F 0F 0 is lower at , and this is










13Note that, in order to make the graph of F0F0 comparable with that of FF, we have
rescaled both horizontal and vertical axis in such a way that E[c2;t] = E[c2;t   c1;t+1] and
S[c2;t] = S[c2;t   c1;t+1].
93.2. Discussion
Proposition 1 states that, under a broad range of circumstances, concern
for relative consumption enhances the role for a PAYG system. However,
it also states that under some circumstances the role for a PAYG system is
diminished when individual care for relative consumption.
In order to analyze the point, it is useful to decompose the eect of a
marginal increase in  on S[c2;t   c1;t+1], evaluated at , into two distinct
eects: the rst due to a reduction in S[c2;t]; the second due to an increase






















where 12 is the correlation coecient between c2;t and c1;t+1.
The intuition behind the claim that ~  >  is that concern for relative
consumption makes it more attractive to link variations in c2;t to variations
in c1;t+1 by increasing . This corresponds to the second term in our decom-
position, which always makes the marginal eect of  larger when relative
consumption matters.
However, it must be considered that when relative consumption matters a
reduction in S[c2;t] is important only inasmuch as it results in a reduction in
S[c2;t   c1;t+1], and the eect of the former on the latter depends on aspects
like the overall volatility of consumption and the correlation between the
consumption of the old and the young. Since the fraction in the rst term of
(17) is never higher than one,14 the benet from a reduction in S[c2;t] is not
larger than the eect on S[c2;t] itself, which represents the marginal benet
of an increase in  when individuals are concerned only for their absolute
level of consumption.
Thus, the two eects should be balanced one against the other, and it
might happen under some circumstances that the diminished benet from a
reduction in S[c2;t] osets the benets from an increase in 12, so that the
condition (17) is not veried.













where the equality is only for j12j = 1.
10As it is clear from (17) itself, the plausibility of such an outcome relies
on S[c1;t+1] being high with respect to S[c2;t], i.e. on high values of  and 

(the latter parameter aects the relative magnitude of c2;t and c1;t+1). When
additionally 12 is so high that S[c2;t] < 12S[c1;t+1], the numerator of the
fraction in the rst term of (17) is negative; hence a smaller S[c2;t] is bad from
the point of view of the old who care fore relative consumption, because it
increases S[c2;t   c1;t+1]. A high 12 is the eect of a high gr and : in these
circumstances, the link between c2;t and c1;t+1 cannot be increased much by
increasing , hence it may happen that the optimal  is lower when relative
consumption matters.
In order to clarify the relevance of the described circumstances, it is useful
to identify some sucient conditions for concern for relative consumption to
imply a higher optimal level of . If we consider that the term in squared
brackets on the right hand side of (14) cannot be larger than 2 for   (1 
),
and it is certainly not larger than unity when 2
g  grgr > 0, we have the
following:
Corollary 1. If 0 <  < 1   
, then 0 <  6 (1   
)=
 implies ~  > .
Moreover, if gr 6 g=r, then 0 <  6 2(1   
)=
 implies ~  > . 2
There are reasons to believe that these sucient conditions will be satis-
ed in practice. First of all, a non-negligible part of a pensioner's reference
group is presumably made of other pensioners. Hence, the relevant standard
of living will depend only in part on the consumption of the young. This
suggests that the parameter , representing the sensitivity of the old with
respect to the young's consumption will be away from its maximum value 
( 6 1).
Secondly, it may be argued that only a part of the consumption of the
young is used as a reference by the old. Consumption is partly age-specic,
and the consumption of the young is usually dierent from that of the old.
Moreover, a fraction of the consumption of the young can actually be an
income production cost (e.g. baby sitting, commuting costs, etc.) and, hence,
it should not be taken into account in the life standard. This argument too
points to a  not so close to .
Lastly, there is the issue of how large is 
 with respect to 1   
. In
a two period framework, we can think that the desired amount of savings
1   
 will not be very far from one-half, so that (1   
)=
 is close to one.
The fact that we usually observe a lower saving rate, closer to one-third,
is presumably related to the fact that in the life cycle the average working
time is approximately twice as much as the time of retirement. To put it
dierently: when comparing total consumption during the working age with
11total consumption at old age, the dierent lengths of the two periods over
which consumption is spread should be taken into account, and  scaled
down accordingly.15
The previous arguments suggest that, even in the extreme case where
individuals consider a one unit increase in the standard of living equivalent
to a one unit decrease in their own consumption, ( = 1) the coecient 
can be expected to be lower than (1 
)=
, so that even the more restrictive
sucient condition reported in Corollary 1 will be satised. Moreover, with
gr < g=r the sucient condition will be violated only for unrealistically
high values of 
 and .16
It is worth emphasizing that when relative consumption matters the role
played by the PAYG pension system is not simply that of risk dierentiation
in the face of nancial markets volatility, as already emphasized in the liter-
ature. This should be clear if we consider the hypothetical case in which rt
is deterministic. In this case, when only absolute consumption matters, the
condition r > g is enough to secure that  = 0. On the contrary, when
we consider concern for relative consumption, the optimal value of  can be
positive even if r > g, and the chance that ~  > 0 increases with 2
g. This
is established by the following




g > r   g (18)
2
Proof. Under the assumption that r > g, the fact that rt is non-stochastic
implies that  = 0. Therefore, the rst order condition for a maximum of
~ V reduces to (18). 
4. Concluding remarks
The introduction of the relative consumption hypothesis in an overlapping
generation model produces a further source of risk, namely the risk of a
change in one's relative position with respect to the reference standard of
living. In this paper we have considered the eect of the assumption that
individuals care for their future relative position on the optimal mix between
15Note that the inclusion of a positive demographic growth would reinforce this argument,
since the same amount of resources would be spread over a number of pensioners which is
lower than the number of workers.
16Referring to the estimates used by Matsen and Thgersen (2004, p. 897), the inequality
is satised for most of the countries considered in that paper.
12PAYG and FF pensions, and found that, when model parameters assume
reasonable values, the role of PAYG is enhanced.17 More precisely, for given
attitude toward risks and given expected values and variability of the relevant
variables, an assessment of the optimal pension mix which overlooks the fact
that individual care for relative consumption is likely to underestimate the
role of the PAYG component.
A few remarks on our main nding and its scope are worth considering.
In order to focus on the insurance eect, we have abstracted from various
important aspects related to pension systems such as the eects on savings
and on the labor market (e.g. Lindbeck and Persson, 2003). Of course,
the overall desirability of a PAYG system also depends on these issues. In
this respect, however, we have to consider the possibility that conventional
wisdom may have to be revisited in the light of the relative consumption
hypothesis. Indeed, we think that a careful exploration of such a possibility
would be a relevant research line to pursue.
Another important restriction is the hypothesis of constant relative risk
aversion. This was made to avoid time inconsistency in the optimal size of
the PAYG system. Although we cannot dispense with such an assumption
if we want to retain time consistency, we emphasize that this is not crucial
for our main result. More precisely, the necessary and sucient condition
provided in our proposition 1 would still be true, though it should be checked
for each period separately, as the optimal FF-PAYG mix could change over
time.
Finally, we have derived our results under the assumption that people
care for their relative standing in society in a cardinal way|more precisely,
that what matters is the dierence between the current consumption and
standard of living. As shown by Bilancini and Boncinelli (2008), this may be
a non-innocuous assumption. In order to further investigate the robustness
of our results, one should repeat the analysis under alternative specications
of concern for relative consumption.
17In our proposition we have dealt with the case commonly considered as the relevant
one, namely that in which the growth of the contribution base is lower than the return on
nancial market (in the deterministic case, this corresponds to dynamic eciency). However,
we expect that the same result applies to the case where r is lower than g. Of course,
the role of FF and PAYG would be reversed in term of risk diversication, but the main
conclusion about the enhanced role of the PAYG remains true.
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